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Is the Strong Dollar Sustainable?
ABSTRACT
This paper presents evidence strongly suggesting that thecurrent
strength of the dollar reflects myopic behavior by international
investors; that is, that part of the dollar's strength can be viewed
as a speculative bubble. At some point this bubble will burst, leading
to a sharp fall in the dollar's value.
The essential argument is that given the modest real interest dif-
ferentials between the U.S. and its tradingpartners, the dollar's
strength amounts to an implicit forecast on the part of the market that
with high probability the dollar will remainvery strong for an extended
period. The paper shows that such sustained dollar strength would lead
the U.S. to Latin American levels of debt relative toGNP, which is
presumably not feasible. Allowing for the possibility that something
will be done to bring the dollar down before this happensactually reinforces
the argument that the current value of the dollar is unreasonable.
Paul Krugman
Sloan School of Mangement
M.I.T., E52—454
Cambridge, MA 02139The strong and strengthening dollar of thepast five years has been a
source of surprise and puzzlement to many observers, who hadgrown accustomed
during the l970s to the fact of a weakened dollar and theprospect of further
depreciation. As recently as 1980 some of the world'sleading international
economists pointed to reasons which they believed ensureda secularly weak
dollar: competition from Japan and the newlyindustrializing countries, slow
productivity growth and an inflation—biasedeconomy. Since then the
trade—weighted dollar has risen more than 40 percent. As the dollar hasrisen
ever higher, economists (and others) have split between those whoargue that
the dollar's new—found strength representsa speculative bubble soon to burst,
and those who argue that the changed exchangerate represents a fundamental
shift in the situation which will reverse itselfgradualiy If at all.
The purpose of this paper is to providea framework for discussing the
sustainability of the strong dollar, and to use that framework to makean
assessment. Along the way the paper also attempts toclarify some related
issues which have been the source of considerableconfusion.
The paper is based on a particular Interpretationof what we mean by
asking whether the dollar is sustainable. The Issue,, I willargue, is not
whether the dollar can continue indefinitely at itspresent level; most if not
all commentators agree that over the longrun market forces must eventually
drive the dollar down to a level consistent withsomething approximating
current account balance. Nor is the issue one of hardlanding" vs. "soft
landing" ——fewwould dispute that new information such as asharp change in
U.S. fiscal policy could lead to an abruptchange in exchange rates. Instead,
the question is whether a reasonable futurepath for the exchange rate, given
what we now know, requires that the dollar declinemore steeply than the
market now expects. If this is thecase, then even without new information
market participants will at some point be forced intoa revision of their—2—
expectations, leading to a plunge in the dollar's value. (This might1 for
example, occur immediately following the presentation of this paper).
To assess the sustainability of the strong dollar2 then, we need to ask
three questions. First, what expectations about the futurecourse of the
exchange rate lie behind the current value of the dollar? Second, what would
be the consequences for U.S. foreign trade and investment if theexchange rate
were in fact to follow these expectations? Third, are these consequences
possible ——orwill a plunge in the dollar happen at some point instead?
What I will show in this paper is that we can give fairly definite answers
to the first two questions, and a less definite answer to the third. The
essential conclusions can be summarized as follows:
(i) The current strength of the dollar, given that there are only modest
differences between real interest rates in the U.S. and in other industrial
countries, amounts to an implicit forecast on the part of international
investors that the dollar will decline only slowly, at a rate averaging less
than three percent per year for the indefinite future.
(ii) A dollar decline this slow would ensure huge U.S. current account
deficits for more than two decades. As a ratio to exports or GNP, U.S.
indebtedness to foreign countries would reach a level comparable to that of
Brazil or Mexico.
(iii) Whether one believes the strong dollar is sustainable dependson
whether one views this level of U.S. external indebtedness as feasible. If,
as I believe, such a level of debt is not feasible, at some point the market
will realize that the dollar must fall more rapidly than It now expects. When
this happens, by the usual logic of asset markets, the dollar will fall
immediately.—3—
The bulk of this paper is concerned withputting some analytical and
statistical flesh on this skeleton argument. Inaddition I consider some
important counter—arguments and qualifications. Thepaper is in five part'.
The first part asks what we mean byquestioning the sustainability of the
strong dollar, and sketches out the major reasons whichmay place limits on
the persistence of a high exchange rate. The secondpart sets out a fracework
for testing the consistency of the market'sexpectations. In the third part
numbers are placed into this framework,yielding the results to which I have
already alluded, namely, that the implicit exchange rate expectations of the
market would require massive U.S. accumulation ofexternal debt. The fourth
part examines the implications of uncertainty. Finally, the fifthpart of the
paper asks what might set off a plunge in the dollar, and how far the dollar
might fall.
I. General Considerations
In spite of the heated debate engendered by thestrong dollar, many issues
remain surprisingly confused. There is no generalagreement on what it means
to say that the exchange rate is or is notsustainable; nor is there any
agreement on the nature of the constraints which may eventually force the
dollar down. As a preliminary step, then, it isimportant to get our minds
clear on these questions. First, we need a clearstatement of what we mean
when we talk of the dollar's sustainability.Second, we need a clear idea of
the constraints on exchange rate.
A. The meaning of sustainability
The question of the sustainability of the dollarmay be broken into a
series of smaller questions. First, is the strength of the dollara permanent—4—
or temporary phenomenon? Second, if the exchange rate is only temporarily
high, is this a reflection of market fundamentals or a speculative bubble?
Third, when the dollar comes down, will it be a gradual "soft landing" or a
sudden "hard landing"? I will argue that the second question, the possibility
that the dollar is at least in part floating on a speculative bubble, is in
fact the crucial and controversial question.
1. Is the strong dollar permanent?
Almost nobody who has seriously studied the issue believes that the U.S.
real exchange rate can remain indefinitely at its present level. A
permanently higher real dollar could only be the result of some shift In the
world economy which increased the relative demand for V.5.—produced goods and
services. Ihere is no evidence of any such shift; the rise in the dollar has
been associated with a rise in the U.S. current account deficit roughly
consistent with what one would have expected from econometric estimates which
pre—date that rise. There have been some attempts to argue that the actual
rise in the U.S. current account deficit is not as large as the measured rise,
due to unreported service export earnings; but these arguments have not
received wide acceptance, and in any case the possible measurement error has
been swamped by the size of the deficit.
In the absence of a shift of world demand toward U.S. goods, a permanently
high dollar would mean a permanent U.S. trade deficit and, because of interest
payments on accumulated debt, an ever—growing U.S. current account deficit.
}obody believes this is possible forever; thus any serious analysis of the
exchange rate must presume that the dollar will eventually come down.
The next question then becomes whether the temporary strength of the
dollar represents an appropriate market reaction to the current economic
situation, given the forces which must eventually push the dollar down again;—5—
or whether the rise in the dollar at least to some extent constitutesa
speculative bubble ——bywhich we mean that it is based on marketexpectations
which are inconsistent with the long—run constraintson the balance of
payments.
2. Is the strong dollar a bubble?
If there is a bubble component to thestrength of the dollar, it is not of
the same order as tulipmania or South Sea shares. The desireof international
investors to hold increasing claims on U.S. residents neednot be explained by
an expectation that the dollar will continue to rise, because
dollar—denominated assets offer both nominal and realyields higher than
securities denominated in the currencies of other industrialcountries. As
documented below, at the time of writing the long term realinterest rate in
the United States was about twoanda half percentage points higher than the
rate in a weighted average of U.S. tradingpartners.
If the strength of the dollar does inpart represent a speculative bubble,
then, it is not a case of wild speculative fever. Thecase for a bubble, on
the contrary, is in fact the argument that there isinsufficient speculation.
The argument runs as follows: the huge trade deficitsengendered by the
strong dollar will eventually push the dollar down. If international
investors recognized this, the expected future depreciation ofthe dollar
would act as a deterrent to holding of dollar—denominatedassets, and the
dollar would be weaker now. However, marketparticipants are myopic, and pay
more attention to the higher yield on dollar securities than to the forces
which must eventually weaken the dollar. Thus the dollaris high because
Investors pay too little attention to theprospect of future exchange rate
changes, not too much.—6 —
Onewayto make this point is to consider the inconsistency between what
econometric forecasters typically assume about the future path of the exchange
rate and the behavior of international investors. Shortly before this paper
was written, DRI released its medium term world economic forecast. In that
forecast it was assumed that the dollar will decline by eight percentage
points per year over the next five years; DRI believed that such a decline was
needed to avoid implausible U.S. accumulation of external debt. But suppose
international investors were to agree. Then the less than three percent
higher yield on dollar—denominated securities as opposed to other industrial
country currencies would be more than offset by the expected depreciation, and
the dollar would not be as strong as it is.
Turning this around, what we can say is that the strength of the dollar
given only modest interest differentials in favor of the U.S. amounts to an
implicit forecast on the part of the market that the dollar will decline only
slowly. If you believe, like the forecasters at DRI, that the exchange rate
must in fact fall faster than this, you must conclude that the dollar has
overreacted to the interest differential due to insufficiently forward—looking
expectations. It is this overreaction, if it exists, which is the
"speculative bubble" component of the dollar's strength.
Speculative bubbles eventually burst. In this case, what would have to
happen is that at some point international investors see that the dollar
cannot actually remain as strong for as long as they had thought. As soon as
they realize this and try to shift out of dollar assets, the dollar will in
fact fall. Thus the argument that the dollar is supported in part by a
speculative bubble is also an argument that the dollar must at some point
plunge.It is tempting to argue that the
an eventual sharp drop in the dollar
irrationality of market expectations.
the issue of a speculative bubble the
will decline gradually or suddenly ——
"hardlanding".
In fact, however, while there is a relationship between
dollar has overshot its appropriate level and the view that
come down with a bump, these are not quite the same. To see
discuss the hard landing vs. soft landing distinction on its
3. Soft vs. hard landings
Two recent discussions of the prospects for the dollar, by Steckler and
Isard (1985) and l4arris (1985), have laid considerable stresson the issue of
whether the dollar can decline gradually over time or must fallsharply
(arriving at opposite conclusions). In each case the issue is seen as whether
a gradually declining path is actually feasible.
The problem with this interpretation is that one couldeasily believe that
the current exchange rate represents a rational marketinterpretation of a
situation which includes some probability of a sharp fall in the dollar.
Suppose, for example, that investors see a small probability inany given year
that the U.S. and other OECD countries willagree on a joint program of fiscal
reform ——contractionin the U.S., expansion in Japan, Germany, and the U.I(.
The announcement of such a program would almost surely lead toan
immediate sharp decline in the dollar. It is fullyconceivable, however, that
the probability of this happening in any oneyear is small enough that the
expected loss from a dollar plunge is offset by higher interest rates on
—7—
reverse is also true ——thatpredicting
is equivalent to arguing for a failure or
This equivalence, if valid, would make
same as the issue of whether the dollar
the issue of a "soft landing" versus a
the view that the
it is likely to
why, we need to
own.—8—
dollar assets, so that the possibility of an abrupt fall in theexchange rate
need not be inconsistent with rational market behavior. Further, a rational
market could produce a strong dollar even if the cumulative probability ofa
dollar crash over time is large enough that the strong dollar ismore likely
to end with a bang than a whimper ——solong as the likelihood of a bang in
any given year is not too high.
The point is that if "newst' is likely to arrive in large lumps rather than
a steady stream, a sharp fall in the dollar will eventually happen whether or
not the current level represents a bubble. In fact, large pieces ofnews can
lead to sudden exchange rate changes whether or not the current exchange rate
is far from equilibrium. The view that when the dollar falls, it will fall
fast, could be a statement about how information arrives rather than a
statement that the dollar is currently overvalued.
We should note, however, that if the market believes that there is always
some possibility of a sharp fall in the dollar, the burden of arguing that the
market's implicit forecast is reasonable becomes considerably harder. The
market must believe that if the dollar does not fall sharply, it will fall
even more gradually than the interest differential. As I will argue at
greater length in part IV, below, in this case the market's forecast makes
sense only if this more gradual decline is itself feasible ——evenif news
leading to a sudden fall of the dollar is likely to come in at some point, the
market must also have a consistent view of what happens if this news does not
come in. As I will show below, even a modest probability of a plunge raises
sharply the level of U.S. indebtedness which we must regard as feasible if we
are to discount the argument for a speculative bubble.—9—
4. What is the issue?
We have broken the question of sustainability into threesub—questions:
permanent vs. temporary sustainability, rational markets vs. speculative
bubble, hard vs. soft landing. All three are important fora proper
understanding of the situation, and all are important for policy. As Sachs
(1985) has pointed out, the conclusion that theexchange rate must come down
means that the inflation benefits of a strong dollar must eventually be
repaid; if the descent is rapid, policymakers had better be prepared to deal
with an inflation bulge somewhere down the line. All this istrue whether or
not the dollar's current strength reflects myopic behavioron the part of
international investors.
l'onetheless, for the remainder of this paper I will focus on thequestion
of whether the dollar is riding on a speculative bubble. Thereason for
emphasizing this question is not that it is necessarily the most important
issue, but simply that the other issues are not, or should not be
controversial. There is no reasonable case for arguing that there has beena
major permanent improvement in U.S. competitiveness, so that there is (among
reasonable observers) a consensus that the strength of the dollar isa
sometime thing. There is also no question that major changes in the
underlying policy environment could produce a sharp fall in the dollar. The
controversial issue is whether an eventual dollar plunge will occureven
without such changes.
The resolution of this issue depends on whether the market'simplicit
exchange rate forecast is in fact feasible. This is a quantitativequestion.
As a preliminary step, however, we need some idea of criteria forfeasibility.—10—
B. Constraints on the Exchange Rate
The argument that the dollar is stronger than fundamentals warrant
depends, as we have seen, on a judgement that the implicit market forecast of
the future course of the dollar is not feasible. That is, this forecast
violates some constraint on the dollar's path. What we need to know to make
this judgement are the nature and position of these constraints. As will
become clear, the real dispute about the dollar's future is largely about
these constraints.
We can roughly categorize possible constraints on the exchange rate into
three types. First are flow constraints: sustaining the strong dollar might
require U.S. trade deficits or capital inflows larger than feasible. Second
are stock constraints: the eventual level of U.S. external indebtedness
implied by a slowly declining dollar might be more than foreign investors are
willing to hold. Finally (not wholly distinct from the first two) are
political constraints: the consequences of a sustained strong dollar might be
politically unacceptable, leading to government action which if properly
foreseen would have brought the dollar down already.
1. Flow constraints
The argument for a flow constraint on the dollar was for obvious reasons
more popular two or three years ago than it is now. The argument was that the
strength of the dollar reflected a failure of international investors to
believe what economic forecasters were telling them about the eventual
consequences of the exchange rate for U.S. competitiveness. Once triple—digit
trade deficits became a reality, the argument went, the markets would be
surprised into a run on the dollar. In particular it was argued that the
United States could not in fact attract capital inflow at the rates necessary—11--
to sustain the dollar in the face of current account deficitsexceeding 100
billion dollars.
This simple view of a flow constraint has clearly been falsifiedby
events. Perhaps there is a maximum rate of capital inflow which can be
attracted to the U.S., but it is higher than the levels we haveseen. And
this constraint is not likely to be tested. If the dollar declinesgradually
from this point on2 the trade deficit as a share of GNPcan also be expected
to decline (though it may first rise somewhat due to lagged effects). So ifa
flow constraint has not yet been binding on the dollar, it isunlikely to
become binding in the future.
The one way in which the idea of a flow constraint could be sustained is
by arguing for what we might call an "average" flow constraint. This might
say that, for example2 one year of triple digit deficits is alright, but five
years is not. It is hard, however, to see how such a constraint might be
justified, other than as either a stock constraint in disguise or a political
constraint.
2. Stock constraints
In contrast to a flow argument which stresses the size ofrequired annual
capital flows to the United States, a stock argument that the exchange rate is
unsustainable would stress the size of the external indebtedness the U.S.must
eventually acquire if the dollar declines only gradually. The question then
is why some level of debt would be "too much".
An extreme possibility would be one of actual U.S.insolvency. In the
current context this possibility might be stated as follows. Suppose that the
implicit forecast of the market turns out to be for a dollar decline so slow
that the burden of interest payments on accumulating U.S. debtrises more—12--
rapidly than the trade deficit declines. In that case the market would
implicitly be forecasting an explosion of U.S. debt which wouldeventually
become impossible to service. We will see later thata rather simple
criterion can be constructed to test whether this willhappen. The U.S.
appears to lie well inside this point1 although uncertainty about the future
policy environment could make solvency an issue (seepart iv).
if solvency is not the problem, we must ask what would limitaccumulation
of U.S. external debt short of this point. Onepossibility is that foreign
investors would be unwilling to hold as large a proportion of theirwealth in
the form of claims on the U.S. as would berequired to allow a slow dollar
decline. Steckler and Isard (1985) posed the question thisway1 arriving at a
projection that foreign countries will eventually have to hold 10percent of
their net worth as claims on the U.S. Theprojections reported below yield
higher debt accumulations3 but the difference is probably notcrucial. What
is crucial is whether there are strong portfoliopreferences over the national
composition of asset holdings.
It is hard to see why there should be.Attempts to apply
capital—asset—pricing—model type calculations suggest that securities in
different currencies ought to be very good substitutes(JKrugman 1980, Frankel
1984). At the same time, empirical tests for effects ofrelative asset
supplies and wealth distribution on the exchange rate have turnedup negative
(Frankel 1982). So we can tentatively dismiss thesuggestion that foreign
investors would be unwilling to put so much of their wealthin the U.S. ——
althoughtheir governments may be unwilling to allow them to doso.
This does not eliminate the possibility of a stockconstraint1 however.
Even if claims on the U.S. remain an acceptably low fractionof foreign
wealth, they might become an unacceptably high fraction of U.S.income. This—13—
is the kind of constraint which provoked the third—world debt crisis. That
is, the problem was not that Brazil's debt became too large a proportion of
OECD portfolios; it was that it began to be perceived as too large relative to
Brazil's earning capacity.
What makes some debt/GNP or debt/export ratio too large? The usual
argument is that once external debt becomes large enough there is a temptation
on the part of the debtor country government to interfere with debt service.
Thus the constraint once again becomes political, requiring us now to turn to
the issue of political constraints.
3. Political constraints
In the end, the sustainability issue seems to come down to politics.
Given our lack of a good analytical framework for thinking about political
decisions, we can safely be quite confident in pronouncing on political
constraints, since we need have no fear of contradiction. Basically there
seem to be three main ways in which political constraints could make the
strong dollar unsustainable.
First is the possibility that the consequences of the dollar for U.S.
international competitiveness will eventually lead to a change in U.S.
monetary and fiscal policies which drives the dollar down. At the time of
writing there seems to be a long—delayed surge in political awareness of the
extent of the effects of a sustained high dollar, suggesting that action may
actually be coming. On the other hand, as suggested in part IV, if the
political response is protectionist it may validate the strong dollar rather
than drive it down.
The second possibility is that foreign governments will limit their export
of capital to the U.S. They might do this for several reasons. To name only
two, those nations might be concerned about the export of savings they would—14—
prefer to see invested at home; or they might be concerned about the
protectionist sentiment generated in the U.S. by the trade deficit.
Finally, U.S. policy toward foreign investors might change once the U.S.
becomes a massive debtor country which must run a trade surplus to service its
foreign debt. This kind of concern is at the heart of the modern theory of
international debt, as argued in the seminal work of Eaton and Gersovitz
(1981). The Eaton—Gersovitz theory is, in short, that governments have an
incentive to repudiate foreign debt when it becomes large, and that they
cannot credibly renounce this option. Since lenders are aware of the
possibility of debt repudiation, they will attempt to ration loans to a level
where the cost of repudiation to a country exceeds the benefits. A debt
crisis arises when lenders decide that the level they have already lent is in
fact too large (Sachs 1984; Krugman 1985).
Could the United States be the subject of a debt crisis? At first one
might dismiss this idea ——theU.S. is not Brazil. As we will see shortly,
however, the implicit market forecast of the exchange rate implies that in
time the U.S. will in effect become Brazil, at least as far as quantitative
measures go. A decline of the dollar gradual enough to justify the current
level of the exchange rate would lead to U.S. debt/GNP and debt/export ratios
comparable to those of Brazil or Mexico.
it might still be argued that the U.S. is too stable politically and too
much the guardian of the market system to be an unreliable haven for funds.
am skeptical about this assertion. The U.S. is, we know, fully capable of
adopting policies toward foreign goods which are both nationalistic and
self—destructive. If the U.S. can be xenophobic about foreign goods, why
should we expect it to be more solicitous toward foreign capital? If we turn
to a calculation of costs and benefits, we might note that the U.S., by virtue—15—
of its size, is less vulnerable to sanctions and retaliation than LDC
debtors. So we cannot dismiss the possibility of a U.S.debtcrisis out of
hand.
C. Summary
In this part of the paper I have attempted a clarification of the basic
issues involved in the question of the sustainability of the strong dollar.
The following conclusions emerged:
——The issue is not whether the dollar can remain indefinitely at current
levels. Anyreasonableanalysis must allow for an eventual return of the
exchange rate to a level consistent with something like current account
balance.
——The issue is instead whether the current exchange rate is too high given
the underlying economic situation, so that part of the dollar's strength
represents a speculative bubble which will eventually burst. We can conclude
that this is the case if we can show that the current exchange rate is
implicitly based on an infeasible forecast for the future exchange rate.
——The constraints on feasibility are essentially political. How much of
their savings will foreign governments be willing to see converted into claims
on the U.S. rather than domestic investment? How much external debt can the
U.S. acquire before nationalistic policies toward foreign investors become a
temptation?
II. A Framework forAssessingSustainability
In our discussion of the meaning of sustainability we argued that the key
issue is whether the current strength of the dollar is excessive given the
underlying economic situation. We can make this assessment in principle in—16—
two stages. First, we can look at the current exchange rate, interestrates,
and other data to infer the market's implicit forecast for the future path of
the exchange rate. Second, we can then examine theconsequences of the
forecast path for the U.S. balance of payments and external indebtedness, and
ask whether these seem feasible.
Of course in practice the procedure is not quite as straightforwardas it
may sound. Questionable assumptions are needed to carry out both stages. Let
us consider each stage in turn.
A. The market's implicit forecast
At first sight, determining what the market expectsmay seem simple: just
look at the forward rate. Because covered interest parity holds, this is
equivalent to using the interest differential as the forecast of the exchange
rate.
There are three basic problems which complicate the task ofassessing
market expectations. First, for balance of payments and indebtedness
calculations what matters is not the nominal but the real exchangerate,
implying that we should use real rather than nominal interest differentials.
This poses a problem because inflation expectations are not soeasily
measurable. Second, the task is complicated by considerations of risk
aversion and portfolio balance. Finally, we need to realize that the market's
expectations are presumably probabilistic rather than deterministic.
1. Using real interest differentials
If international investors are close enough to risk neutrality, and if
concerns about expropriation are not an issue (see later discussion of the
safe haven argument), the real interest differential will be the market's
forecast of the future change in the real exchange rate.—17—
The problem here is in identifying inflation expectations. Ordinarily we
proxy for these by using recent past rates of inflation. This is reasonable
if we are looking only a short distance ahead, but not if we are looking at a
longer term. Unfortunately, the long term expectations of the market are what
we need for our sustainability analysis.
What gives this problem special salience is that the nominal long—term
interest differential between the U.S. and Germany or Japan is substantially
higher than the short—term differential, toes this reflect expectations about
real rates or about inflation? I find it hard to understand why the market
should expect either a further rise in U.S. real interest rates or a fall in
real rates in other industrial countries, so a tentative conclusion might be
that inflation expectations are the culprit. The point, however, is that we
really don't know.
For the purposes of this paper I will adopt a less than satisfactory
solution. This is to construct an estimate of the implicit market forecast by
using long term bond rates and recent inflation rates. If the excess of U.S.
long—term over short—term rates actually reflects market fears of renewed
inflation, this gives a lower bound to the market's real exchange rate
forecast ——whichis what we want to test for sustainability.
2. Portfolio balance
If risk aversion leads to low substitutability among assets denominated in
different currencies, the procedure of taking the interest differential as the
market's forecast of the change in the exchange rate will not be valid. We
can argue, however, that the bias is probably not large and, furthermore! that
it biases us toward finding the exchange rate sustainable.-18—
We have already noted that such quantitative evidenceas there is does not
support the view either that international investors should view securities
denominated in different currencies as poor substitutes or that shifts in
relative asset supplies or wealth distribution have noticeable exchange rate
effects. If this evidence is right, we should not be too concerned about
using the interest differential as a proxy for exchange rate expectations.
To the extent that portfolio balance is a consideration, note thatas
foreigners are required to hold increasing claims on the U.S., they will want
higher relative returns on these claims. This means that if we think that
currently the interest differential is equal to the expected rate of exchange
rate change, as U.S. indebtedness grows it will become an overestimate of
expected dollar depreciation, and projecting interest differentials forward
will again yield a lower bound to the implicit market forecast. The onlyway
to avoid this conclusion is to assert that international investors are
currently willing to hold dollar assets with a lower expected yield than other
assets. lo argue this, we must assert that there has been a substantial shift
in portfolio preferences in the last few years. This brings us to the "safe
haven" argument, which is part of the general issue of uncertainty.
3. Uncertainty and diffuse forecasts
Nobody pretends to have an exact exchange rate forecast. The current
value of the dollar reflects not a point expectation but aprobability
distribution.
Discussions about the exchange rate seem to point to two major sources of
uncertainty in market expectations. The first is concern that political
developments outside the U.S. could lead to at least partial expropriation of
assets. This is presumably a low—probability event, but not much probability—19—
need be attached to drastic events to make them potent for asset markets. The
other is the prospect that eventually OECD governments will do something about
the underlying causes of the strong dollar, widely believed to be the
divergence in fiscal policies.
These sources of uncertainty cannot be neglected. However it will be
useful to postpone their consideration until part IV of the paper. There we
will see that the safe haven argument works in favor of dollar sustainability,
but can be discounted on empirical grounds. The prospect of a policy change,
on the other hand, actually makes it much harder to believe that the dollar's
strength is appropriate given the fundamentals.
B. A model of the balance of payments and external indebtedness
The upshot of our discussion so far has been that as a first pass it makes
sense to proxy for market expectations by assuming that the real exchange rate
will depreciate steadily at the current real interest differential. What we
need next is a framework for converting this exchange rate forecast into a
forecast of the U.S. balance of payments and exchange rate. What we will
develop here is a simplified model which lends itself easily to manipulation
and analysis.
1. Assumptions of the model
Let E be the natural logarithm of the U.S. real exchange rate, measured
against some appropriately weighted basket of foreign currencies. Then the
assumption of our analysis will be that the implicit market forecast of P is
that it will decline at a rate equal to the differential between U.S. and
foreign rates of return:
(1) a— (r_r*)—20—
The U.S. balance of payments will depend on E. Let us define B as the
current account deficit exclusive of interest payments, measured as a fraction
of GNP. (Loosely, we can call this the trade deficit as a share of GNP). We
will assume that B is a linear function of B. There will be some level of
B, L, for which B0; thus we can write
(2) Ety (B—B)
That is, the trade deficit as a share of GNP is proportional to the
percentage "overvaluation" of the dollar £ —B.
Let CA be the inflation—adjusted U.S. current account deficit as a share
of CNP; this may be written
(3)CAtB+rD
where D is the ratio of external debt to GNP.
Finally, the growth of the debt—CNP ratio will reflect both the current
account deficit and the growth of GM' itself:
(4) b CA—gDB +(r—g)D
It is important to stress once again that the purpose of this model is not
to make a forecast. Rather, it is to draw out the implications of the
exchange rate forecast implicit in the current value of the dollar. If these
implications turn out to be implausible, we must argue that the market is
wrong and substitute some other forecast.
2. Dynamics of the model
The model just described has two sources of change over time. First is
the "extrinsic" dynamics of exchange depreciation. Second is the "intrinsic"
dynamics of debt accumulation.—21—
The joint impact of these dynamics can most easily be understood by
focussing on the debt/GNP ratio D. This may be analyzed as follows: First1
suppose that a trade deficit of is incurred in period t. How much
will this contribute to the debt/GNP ratio in a later period T? The answer
depends on two components. The deficit compounds at a rate r1 increasing the
numerator of the ratio; but the growth of the economy raises the denominator








At the same time, the market's implicit forecast (1) implies that the
exchange rate is determined by
(6) F —(r_r*)t
and thus that the trade balance is
(7) Bt (F0— ) —y(r_r*) t
This may be substituted back into (5) and the result integrated. A
closed—form solution can be derived by integrating by parts: it is






Equation(8) is fairly nasty—looking2 but having this closed—form solution
is helpful as a way of isolating several key variables.
One question we might ask is whether the decline in the exchange rate is
rapid enough to eventually balance U.S. accounts2 or whether growing interest
payments on accumulated debt will outpace the improvement in the trade
balance. Suppose that we believe that the U.S. currently has roughly zero net
debt. By inspecting (8), we can then see that DT will explode upward if
—r_r* E —E> .Thusthis in effect becomes a test of whether the market 's 0 r—g
expectations are consistent with solvency. Note that E— £ is the percentage
(logarithmically measured) by which the exchange rate initially exceeds the
level which would yield trade balance. This suggests that our discussion
should focus on the extent of dollar "overvaluation" in this sense, on the
real interest differential, and on the extent to which the real interest rate
exceeds the growth rate.
if the exchange rate passes the solvency test, we would still like to
know how much debt the U.S. would have to accumulate if market expectations
are to be confirmed. As it turns out, the same three variables play a
crucial role. To see this, note that (8) gives us as a function of
time T. If the solvency test is passed, the debt—GNP ratio eventually
reaches a maximum, then turns down. Now long does it take to reach this
maximum?IfD 0, the time of maximum D T ,canbe shown to be 0 max
(9) T —--l r_r*
max r—gnr_r* —(F—r)(r—g)
T is positive if and only if our solvency criterion is satisfied,
which should not be surprising.—23—
Once we know Tmaxi we can plug it in to get Dmaxr the maximum
debt—export ratio implied by market expectations.
All (al]J) that we need to do to assess the feasibility of the exchange
rate expectations implicit in the current exchange rate is to derive estimates
of four variables. These are the real interest differential r_r*; the real
interest—growth differential r—g; the overvaluation of the exchange rate
relative to its trade—balance level E —F; and a fourth variable which we 0
have not yet emphasized1 the responsiveness of the trade balance to the
exchange rate, y. Once we have these variables we can plug them in,
determine the path of debt, and ask whether it looks possible.
Ill. The Market's Implicit Forecast (May 1985)
We have now seen how to use a few pieces of data plus a lot of assumptions
to derive the balance of payments and debt consequences of the exchange rate
forecast which implicitly underlies the current strength of the dollar. The
next step is to fill in the data ——ormore accurately2 to discuss some
alternative proxies for the data we would like to have. Then we can solve for
the implied path of debt and the balance of payments and ask whether it is
feasible.
A. Data
We have seen that the dynamics of the debt—export ratio given the market's
implicit forecast depend on four parameters: the overvaluation of the dollar
relative to the level which would produce trade balance, the real interest
differential, the difference between the real interest rate and growth, and
the sensitivity of the trade balance to the real exchange rate. None of these
is as well—defined a number in practice as in our mode1 but we can provide
some reasonable estimates.—24—
1. Dollar overvaluatjon
By dollar overvaluation we mean the excess of the exchangerate over the
level which would produce current account balance. This shouldnot be taken
either as a statement about market failure or about desirablepolicy ——we
want to test whether the dollar's overvaluatlon is reasonable given other
data, not assert that any overvaluation in this sense is unreasonableor
undesirable.
The procedure I will use for measuring overvaluation Is thesimple one of
assuming that in a base period F —Fwas equal to zero. The base period I
will use is l98O a year in which the U.S. in fact hadan approximately zero
current account.
This choice Is subject to three main objections. Theseare the
following: First, although 1980 was a year of current balance, at the time
many observers believed that if the dollar had remained at that level the TJ.S.
would over time have moved into substantial currentsurplus ——i.e.that in a
longer—run sense the dollar was undervalued In thatyear. Second, and working
in the opposite direction, the world economic environment has shifted since
1980 in such a way as to reduce the demand for U.S.exports. Sluggish growth
in Europe and the third—world debt crisis would, other thingsequals require a
depreciation in the dollar to leave the U.S. current accountunchanged.
Third, In 1980 the U.S. current account was in part sustained byearnings on
foreign assets; the cumulative current account deficit since then Iswidely
believed to have eliminated the U.S. net creditor position.
On balance, my guess is that the second and third factorsoutweigh the
first. That is, the real dollar appreciation since 1980represents a minimum
estimate of the real depreciation which would benecessary to restore current
account balance.—25—
This still leaves the problem of measuring the real appreciation. As
lable I shows, real appreciation has been very uneven vis—a—vis different
countries, posing a serious index number problem. Roughly speaking, we can
think of this as a three—part problem. Against Canada, which because of
geography and trade agreements is a disproportionately important U.S. trading
partner, the U.S. has had only a mild real appreciation. Against Japanthe
U.S. has had what until recently we would have considered a massive real
appreciation. Even this, however, is dwarfed by the rise of the dollar
against European currencies.
There are several widely used exchange rate indexes which assign weights
to countries based either on bilateral or multilateral trade. For the
purposes of the paper, however, it is crucial to be surethat we are
consistent in our measurement of exchange rates and interest differentials
(see below). Thus it is useful to "roll our own" real exchange rate index.
The estimate of F —£in Table 2 weights the data in Table 1 by 1980
bilateral trade weights, yielding an estimated dollar "overvaluation" of .33.
2. The real interest differential
The first major problem in measuring the real interest differential is
that of finding a proxy for expected inflation. A variety of measures have
been compared by Blanchard and Summers (1984) and Frankel (1985);
unfortunately the results are quite sensitive to the measure chosen. Forthe
purposes of this paper the real interest rate will bemeasured by the
difference between the government bond rate and the one—year rate of consumer
price inflation. The problems with this measure are obvious, but it is not
clear that we can do much better.—26—
Beyond this problem, we also have an index number problem, as Table I
shows. The U.S. appears to have approximately the same real interestrate as
Canada, but substantially higher rates than Germany and Japan. Thus as in the
case of overvaluation it is necessary to choose weights.
What are the appropriate weights? It should be apparent on reflection
that if we take the real interest differential as the market expectation of
real depreciation, and we want to estimate the consequences of market
expectations for the trade balance, then national interest rates should be
weighted according to the same scheme as real exchange rates. It may at first
sight seem reasonable to use some alternative weighting, oriented toward
financial as opposed to trade importance, but in fact this makes no sense.
Table II, then, reports an estimate of the real interest differential
which uses the same weights as are used to compute dollar overvaluation.
3. The interest—growth differential
This applies purely to domestic U.S.
problems. The major concerns are how to
problem which we have already considered
the long—run U.S. real growth rate. In
U.S. real interest rate as computed for
a long run growth rate of 3percent.
data and thus poses no index number
measure the real interest rate ——a
,ifnot solved ——andhow to estimate
Table II the number reported uses the
the interest differential2 and assume
4. The sensitivity of the trade balance to the exchange rate
The parameter y could be derived from econometric estimation.
However, such estimates are sensitive to the choice of exchange rate
Furthermore, there is an implied consistency between the estimate of
overvaluation, the current trade deficit, and the assumed sensitivity
index.
of trade—27—
toexchange rates. That is, according to the model, we should have
y CE— E)Bwhere Bis the current trade deficit as a share of GNP.
Thissuggeststhat we can simpiy invert the relationship and estimate
yB/CE —E).Essentially this is what I do, but with a modification to
take account of lags in trade balance adjustment.
In 1984 the current account deficit was 2.6 percent of GNP, but this gap
could be expected to widen: the May 1985 exchange rate was higher than the
1984 average, and the 1984 deficit surely did not reflect the full effects of
that year's rate. What I will assume, somewhat arbitrarily, is that a
persistence of the May 1985 rate would eventually lead to a non—factor—service
deficit of 3.3 percent of CNP. It is arguable that owing to long—term
substitution effects even this number is a serious understatement.
B. Simulating U.S. Debt
We can now use the data in Table II, together with equations (8) and (9),
to calculate the path of U.S. external debt resulting from the market's
implicit forecast of the exchange rate. It is possible to calculate the
entire path, but the essential numbers we need to know are only two: how many
years does it take before the debt/GNP ratio stabilizes, and how high does
this ratio go?
These numbers are reported on the last two lines of Table II. The
calculation finds that the debt to GNP ratio will not stabilize for 23 years,
and that the implied ratio is nearly one—half.
These are clearly striking numbers. They imply an extremely persistent
U.S. external deficit, and an eventual level of U.S. external indebtedness
relative to GNP comparable to that of Mexico or Brazil. Two questions
immediately present themselves. First, how sensitive are the calculations to—28—
possible source of error? Second1 if we accept the calculations, is this a
feasible outcome? The calculations reported in Table II could bewrong for
two reasons: the parameters could be badly estimated, or the wholeapproach
could be wrong.
Thanks to the simplicity of the analytical framework,assessing
sensitivity to parameters is quite straightforward. Table III reports some
sensitivity tests. (Note that in these tests the initial deficitB0 is held
fixed, and the estimate of the sensitivity of the deficit to the exchange rate
y is adjusted as necessary). The most distressing feature of the table is
the high sensitivity of the results to the estimate of the real interest
differential. A one percentage point increase in our estimate of this
differential substantially reduces the time until the debt ratio stabilizes
and the level at which it stabilizes. On the other hand, a onepercentage
point reduction in our estimate pushes us over the boundary of the solvency
test: interest payments rise faster than the trade deficit falls, and the
debt ratio rises without limit. Since we have emphasized theuncertainty of
our real interest rate estimates, this is alarming.
The question is which way an estimate of the expected inflation
differential between the U.S. and Germany or Japan based on recent inflation
experience is likely to be biased. Many businessmen in the U.S. seem to place
at least some weight on the possibility of a resurgence of inflation;
suggesting that the real interest differential is smaller, not larger, than
the estimate.
More important than questions about the parameters, however,are doubts
about whether the framework is right. Most economists, presented with
calculations like these, reply by arguing that it is unlikely thatthings will
get this far ——somethingwill be done to bring the dollar down long before—29—
debt reaches such levels. As I will argue below, this argument actually
reinforces the case for viewing the dollar's strength as a speculative bubble.
The remaining question is whether the paths of debt described above are in
fact feasible. There is no way to settle this definitively. Essentially one
must ask whether the presumed political stability of the U.S. exempts it from
Latin—style crises of confidence) or whether on the contrary the size of the
U.S. makes it impossible for it to engage in Latin—level external borrowing.
At least we should recognize that the level of the dollar does imply a
forecast of an eventual accumulation of immense debt ——andthat it is
unlikely that many international investors have thought this through.
IV. Allowing for Uncertainty
A decline of the dollar slow enough to justify its current strength would
lead in the long run to a huge U.S. foreign debt. In the long run, however
we are all... When the unacceptable consequences of the strong dollar lie
many years in the future, it seems natural to discount them on the grounds
that something will happen long before we reach that point.
It is certainly true that we should allow for uncertainty in assessing the
sustainability of the strong dollar. However, it is important to be careful
in specifying the nature of the uncertainty. Uncertainty about the security
of foreign assets ——thesafe haven" argument ——doesmitigate the
consequences of the calculations reported above. The expectation that
sometime in the next 25 years something will be done about the dollar, on the
other hand, reinforces the argument.—30—
A. The Safe Haven Argument
The safe haven argument holds that capital flows into the U.S. are
motivated not merely by interest differentials but also by a perception that
the U.S. is a more secure place in which to invest. In principle this is a
reasonable argument. It is usually, however, stated loosely in a way which
falls to show its limitations.
First, we must bear in mind that what needs explaining is the strength of
the dollar vis—a—vis other industrial country currencies2 especially European
currencies, not vis—a--vis cruzeiros or pesos. A useful safe haven argument
must explain why an international investor would hold dollar securities rather
than mark securities even if the expected rate of dollar depreciation exceeds
the interest differential.
Second, the relevant margin of choice is between interest—bearing
securities. This means that the general considerations which safe—haven
advocates often invoke, such as differences in national growth prospects, are
relevant only if they affect the prospects for repayment on these securities.
An investor may feel that America is reinvigorated while Europe is stagnant,
but this only affects our calculations in the last section if European
stagnation translates into an increased probability that bonds issued by
European governments will not be honored.
To put it bluntly: the safe haven argument, to help explain the strength
of the dollar, must be an argument that the market attaches a significant
probability to the prospect that claims on Europeans or Japanese will at some
point be repudiated or expropriated.
If we grant this argument, it is a powerful one. Suppose that there is a
perceived three percent chance in any given year that the Red Army will
overrun Europe and the Red Navy overrun Japan. Then international investors—31—
would be willing to hold U.S. assets even at an expected return differential
of minus three percentage points. Turning this around, the market's implicit
forecast for the real exchange rate if Russia does not attack is for a decline
at 5.4 percent per year, rather than 2.4 percent ——sharplyreducing the
implied debt accumulation.
We could argue about whether this scenario is plausible. The important
question, however is whether the market believes that claims on European
countries are really subject to more political risk than claims on the U.S.
Eere there is a major piece of counter—evidence: Eurodollar interest rates do
not significantly differ from U.S. rates. This constitutes prima fade
evidence that the role of political risk does not allow us to dismiss
calculations that suggest that a sustained high dollar will lead to heavy debt
accumulation.
B. Possibility of a dollar stabilization
The most common argument against long—term calculations of the kind
reported in Part 111 of this paper is that given the uncertainty in the world
we will never see that long run, and that it should therefore not be a source
of concern. As we have just seen one type of uncertainty! fears of
expropriation, does in principle allow us to downplay the importance of
long—run issues. We have rejected the safe haven argument for the dollar's
strength; but it may seem plausible to imagine that other forms of uncertainty
will be similar in their implications.
One particularly common argument is that long term forecasts of the
effects of a strong dollar are irrelevant because government policy will not
in fact allow the strong dollar to go on indefinitely. On this argument, in
any given year there is some probability that the underlying causes of the—32--
strong dollar will be eliminated. The U.S. will finally deal with its budget
deficit, other industrial countries will adopt more expansionary fiscal
policies, and so on. if this probability is high enough in eachyear, the
likelihood that the strong dollar willgo on long enough to produce the
results described above will be small ——andthe argument is that therefore
the long run can be disregarded.
Although this argument may seem plausible, however, it is in factwrong.
Indeed, the possibility that something will be done about the exchange rate
makes it more likely, not less, that the currentstrength of the dollar
represents in part a speculative bubble.
One way to get some intuition on this is to imagine first that therewere
no possibility of a change in policy that would bring the dollar down. In the
absence of a speculative bubble the market's implicitforecast, as constructed
earlier, would have to imply feasible paths for deficits and external debt.
Now suppose that we add to this situation thepossibility of a sudden fall in
the dollar due to changes in policy. Surely the effect of thisaddition,
given rational expectations, would be to lower the exchange rate. Thismakes
it very peculiar to turn around and argue that an exchange rate whichseems to
imply infeasible debt accumulation does not represent a bubble because there
is a possibility of a plunge in the exchange rate somewherealong the way.
To see the right way to think about this issue, it is usefulto draw an
analogy with a somewhat similar issue, the pricing of gold. In a classic
analysis of the pricing of gold under rational expectations, Salant and
Henderson (1978) pointed out that the market is always facingsome probability
of a gold auction by governments, which woulddepress the price. What they
showed was that with rational expectations, the price of gold betweenauctions
must obey the following rules: (i) the price must rise ata rate exceedingthe interest rate by an amount which just compensates investors for the risk
of capital loss if an auction occurs; (ii) given this rate of price increase,
the level of the price must be such that the path of prices if no auction
occurs is just feasible ——intheir context, the consumption of gold over time
must just exhaust the initial stock of gold.
Bow does this analogy apply to the dollar? If there is a probability of
sudden decline in the dollar due to a change in policy, and we have rational
expectations, then (i) the market must expect that if the dollar does not
plunge it will decline at a rate which is less than the interest differential,
by an amount which compensates investors for the expected capital loss from a
plunge, and (ii) this path must itself be feasible.
Suppose, for example, that the real interest differential is three
percentage points) and that the market believes that there is a five percent
chance that in any given year the dollar will plunge by 40 percent. Then
investors must expect that during years in which the dollar does not plunge it
will fall at only one percent per year, so that they are compensated for the
expected two percent capital loss. And if the investors are behaving
appropriately, they must believe that a path on which the dollar declines only
one percent per year is itself feasible.
We have already seen evidence to suggest that it will be hard to reconcile
any significant probability of action to bring the dollar down with a feasible
path for U.S. external debt. Even if the dollar declines by the full amount
of the interest differential, the accumulation of debt will be extremely
large, and we have seen that the eventual accumulation is very sensitive to
the expected rate of decline. At the same time, the dollar is sufficiently
above the level that would produce current account balance that a fall to that
level would impose a very large capital loss on holders of dollar securities.—34—
What thismeans is that even a small probability of such a fall will require a
much more gradual decline or even a rise in the dollar until the decline takes
place, implying rapid accumulation of debt.
This much seems obvious even without an explicit calculation. It is
helpful3 however, to reinforce the point by carrying out some simulation
experiments.
C. The Market's Implicit Forecast when Dollar Stabilization is a
Possibility
We have just argued that introducing a significant probability of a dollar
stabilization means that the market is implicitly forecastingvery rapid debt
accumulation until this stabilization occurs. The purpose of this section is
to confirm this argument with illustrative simulation exercises.
Unfortunately it is not possible to state this problem in a way that leads
to a dosed—form expression like that in Part II. Thus we will shift here to
a discrete—time framework. This means that the results do not correspond
exactly with the results in Part III, although they are quite close.
The discrete—time model is set up as follows. First, we have a debt
accumulation equation,
(10)DtaY (E—)+(l+r—g)D1
where D and E are defined as before.
On the exchange rate side, we now allow for the possibility ofa dollar
stabilization. It is assumed that there is a constant probability irthat
policy actions will bring the dollar down to a level which stabilizes the
debt/GNP ratio D. Let be this exchange rate; it is clearly defined by—35—
(11) ti_LAD
Our equation for exchange rate dynamics must have the expected capital
loss from dollar decline just equal the interest differential. If the dollar
is not stabilized, the capital loss is Et_1Et. If the dollar is
stabilized, it is t—l E. Thus until stabilization takes place we must have
(12) (l11) CE1 E) + U (E1 _r) r —r*
which may be rearranged to yield
(13) Et —Ea _JL_ Li _1ik- (Et_1
—U— (r_r*)
Equations (10) and (13) define an easily simulated system in E and D.
We can now turn to the issue we raised: what are the effects of
introducing some risk of a dollar stabilization? Table 4 reports the results
of two simulations. In the first simulation it is set equal to 0.067,
implying a 50 percent chance of dollar stabilization within 10 years; in the
second simulation ii is set at 0.129., implying a 50 percent chance of dollar
stabilization within 5 years.
The right way to read the table is as a series of statements of the
following kind: "If I believe that there is a 50 percent probability that
something will be done about the dollar in the next five years, and if I also
believe that the current value of the dollar is justified, then I must believe
that it is feasible for U.S. external debt to grow to 71 percent of GNP within
10 years, since there is a 25 percent chance that nothing will be done about
the dollar over that time".
The results are clearly striking. To understand them, note that if there
is a substantial probability that the dollar will fall sharply, investors will
hold dollar securities only if they otherwise yield a substantial premium over—36—
foreign assets. Even in the low iicase,this turns out to require an actual
rise in the dollar as long as the stabilization does notoccur; and this rise
takes place at an accelerating rate. The result is snowballing U.S. external
debt.
The point of this exercise should be made clear. Onceagain2 the exercise
is not an actual forecast. Instead, it aims to draw out thenecessary
implications of beliefs about the exchange rate. In thiscase, what the
exercise says is that if you believe that the probability of dollar
stabilization is high enough that we need notworry about very long run
forecasts2 you must either believe that expected capital losses froma
declining dollar exceed the interest differential ——i.e.,that the market has
got it wrong ——orthat it is possible for the U.S. to have avery rapid
growth of external debt.
C. Protectionism as a Policy Response
We have now seen that introducing the possibility of actionto correct the
exchange rate makes it harder to argue that the market is justified in valuing
the dollar as high as it does. To conclude thispart of the paper, however,
it might be useful to point out that °doing something about the dollar"might
involve treating symptoms rather than causes ——andthat this might in a
peculiar way help justify the dollar's strength.
Suppose that governments are not in fact willing to address what most
economists regard as the causes of the strong dollar, but insteadtry to
insulate their economies from the consequences of the exchange rate.Suppose,
for example, that the U.S. imposes import tariffs andexport subsidies, or
that other countries impose exchange controls which give riseto a divergence
between commercial and fianancial rates of exchange. Then the result would be—37—
to break the link between the market's implicit exchange rate forecast and any
necessary balance of payments consequences.
What this amounts to saying is that it is possible to justify the strong
dollar if one believes that market participants expect the overvalued exchange
rate to be validated by protectionism.
There is no simple way to test whether this is true. All that one can say
is that the idea of a protectionist validation for the dollar is not common
currency among businessmen. Strong proponents of efficient markets may argue
that investors act as if they knew things they do not appear consciously to
understand; against this argument there is no defense except that of
plausibility.
V. Prospects for the Dollar
Part III of this paper offered evidence that the dollar is stronger than
warranted by the interest differential between the United States and other
industrial countries. Part IV went on to argue that the nature of the
uncertainty facing international investors is such as to reinforce the
conclusion that the strength of the dollar in some degree represents a
speculative bubble. The obvious next questions are when the bubble will
burst, and how far the dollar will fall.
Inevitably the answers to these questions are both for the most part the
disappointing one that we don't know. This paper will not yield any hot tips
to be used for immediate speculative purposes. The best we can do is, first,
to explain ynodefinite answer can be given, and second to provide at least
some bounds on the extent of the plunge.—38—
A. When will the bubble burst?
The method used in this paper is by nature ill—suitedto predicting the
actual future path of the dollar. We began by adoptingas the maintained
hypothesis the assumption that the market is in factmaking a rational
forecast, then argued that the market's implicit forecast is not feasible.
This shows that rational expectations isnot the right model, but gives us no
clue to what the right model is.
The point is that we have very little idea of howto model asset markets
other than via the assumption of rationalexpectations. The historical record
has been described by such authors as Kindleberger(1978), and vivid literary
discussions such as the famous essay of Keynes (1937)may be found, but these
are not as helpful as we might like.
All that we can say with any assurance is that when the dollardoes
decline it will reveal its speculativecomponent either by plunging for no
apparent reason or by reacting disproportionately to whatever change in he
fundamentals appears to set it off.
B. Row much will the dollar decline?
As a preliminary to asking how much the dollar will declinewhen it
finally does, it seems natural to ask how much of the dollar'scurrent
strength represents a speculative bubble. As we willargue in a moment, this
is not necessarily a good indicator of what willhappen when the bubble
bursts. Nonetheless, it is surely aninteresting question in its ownright.
What we have argued is that given the combination ofa fairly small
interest differential and some probability ofa sharp decline in the dollar
when policy is changed, the current value of the dollarwould lead to an
infeasible level of U.S. indebtedness. To estimate the "bubblecomponent" of—39—
the exchange rate, then, what we need to do is to decide how high a debt level
is feasible and how high a probability of a policy change there is in any
given year, then find the level of the exchange rate which would keep debt
within this bound while offering investors compensation for the expected
capital loss.
Of course we do not in fact know what level of debt is too much or how
likely a policy shift is. The best we can do is to present a menu. This is
done in Table 5.
The table asks how much the exchange rate would have to depreciate given
several different estimates of the probability of policy change, measured by
the probability of something being done within the next five years, and for
several different estimates of the maximum sustainable U.S. debt/GNP ratio.
As in Table 4 it is assumed that the effect of a policy change would be to
lower the dollar to precisely the point at which the debt/GNP ratio stabilizes.
Twoimportantpoints can be learned from this table. The first is that
for plausible values the speculative bubble component of the dollar's strength
is substantial. If one believes that there is a 50 percent chance that the
dollar will be brought down over the next 5 years, and that the U.S. cannot
accumulate an external debt of more than 20 percent of GNP, the dollar should
be 19 percent lower than it now is.
The second lesson, however, is that there is still a substantial justified
component to the dollar's strength. For the same case, even if the
speculative bubble were eliminated the dollar would still be at a level 14
percent above the level which would produce a balanced current account.
It is tempting to argue from this that when the dollar falls it will fall
only part of the way, and that therefore fears of a plunge to below 1980
levels are unjustified. The problem is that if one accepts the argument of—40—
this paper, the market has not been behavingas if it makes a rational
assessment of long term prospects. What will happen when themarket revises
its opinion is unlikely to be a sudden access of rationalexpectations.
Rather, the market will simply go make a new set of mistakes.These mistakes
could, though they need not be, in the opposite direction,leading to an
excessively weak dollar rather than an excessively strongone. Thus it is
possible, though not certain, that we will see an abrupt shift froman
overvalued to an undervalued dollar.
What we can say with greater certainty is that thelonger the strong
dollar persists, the farther it is likely to fall.The reason is simply
growing indebtedness. The formula for', the exchangerate which would
stabilize the debt-CNP ratio, makes this clear:every percentage point added
to the debt—CNP ratio reducesby half a percentage point. Since a
continuation of the current exchange rate wouldimply a debt—GNP ratio of
nearly 20 percent by 1990, this is not a negligible factor.
Conclusions
This paper has committed what is usuallyregarded as a cardinal sin In
economics. It has argued that a major financial market hassimply made a
mistake, failing to make proper use of information availableto it. I have
attempted to demonstrate that given the relatively modest incentivesto hold
dollars, and especially given the possibility ofan eventual exchange rate
stabilization which brings the dollar down, thewillingness of international
investors to acquire growing claims on the U.S.is misguided. It appears that
the market has simply not done itsarithmetic, and has failed to realize that
its expectations about continued dollarstrength are not feasible.—41—
Making a pronouncement like this violates the normal practice of
economics, it is a well—established rule in economics that one should always
assume that the participants in a market understand it better than you do ——
afterall! they have both more resources and stronger incentives. To
second—guess investors with so much at stake Is a gross violation of this
rule. Yet perhaps we can offer some support for breaking the rule this one
time.
First, we should notice that the strong dollar lies well outside the range
of experience of anyone in the marketplace. No matter how much experience an
exchange trader of portfolio manager has had, she has never seen anything like
this. The assumption of market efficiency is often justified on an
evolutionary basis: over time market participants develop instincts or rules
of thumb which enable theni to act as if' they were solving optimal
forecasting problems. When the event lies outside previous experience, this
evolutionary argument will not work.
Second, the type of analysis required to assess the sustainability of the
dollar is economic analysis. The important things to consider are macro
variables such as deficits and debt, not details of the financial markets. In
other words, the necessary talents required are those of a professional
economist rather than an exchange trader or a portfolio manager.
All of this brings us to the final point: some economist must sometimes
be willing to say that the market is wrong. If the market has nothing to go
on but economic analysis ——whichis the case here ——andeconomists always
assume that the market is rights we have a circularity which allows the
exchange rate to drift at will. And perhaps that is just what has happened.—42—
Table1: Real Depreciation and Real Interest Differentials
Real depreciation Real interest
againstU.S. dollar, differential against









a Change inexchange rate from 1980 average to Nay 10, 1985, deflated
by change in consumer prices from 1980average to Febrary 1985.
Sources: International Financial Statistics Economist
b Differencein long term government bond rates, Nay 10, 1985minus
difference in CPI inflation, year endingFebruary 1985.
Sources: Ibid.-.43—
Table 2: Parameter estimates and simulation results
Parameter estimates

























Table 4: tebt/GNP ratios under uncertainty
50% probability of dollar stabilization within:






ratio after 135 460
20 years
if no stabilization—46—
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